



Director of  
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**Saturday  
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## Black Africa's Portuguese-Speaking and Frontline States



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**SOUTHERN AFRICA: Summit Meetings**

***Pretoria is pleased by the moderation displayed during summit meetings last weekend of the Frontline and Portuguese-speaking states, according to the US Embassy in Cape Town.*** [redacted]

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The summit publicly endorsed Mozambique's and Angola's bilateral agreements with South Africa. [redacted]

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According to diplomatic reporting, neither summit pressed Angola on the issues of Cuban troop withdrawal or talks with the UNITA insurgents. Both meetings, nevertheless, strongly reaffirmed support for the UN plan for Namibian independence and rejected linking Namibian independence to a Cuban withdrawal. [redacted]

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The US Embassy in Maputo reports Machel pressed Angolan President dos Santos in private to agree to a formula for a Cuban troop withdrawal and to begin negotiations with UNITA. Dos Santos claimed in response that the UNITA threat prevented the departure of Cuban troops and that opposition within the ruling party has prevented discussions with insurgent leader Savimbi. [redacted]

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**Comment:** The unified front presented at the two summits will make it more difficult for radical African states and the OAU to criticize openly the bilateral accords with South Africa. Private tensions within the Frontline States, however, reflect black Africa's wariness toward formal accommodations with Pretoria and may presage more active opposition to further diplomatic concessions. [redacted]

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**COLOMBIA:****Shift in Antinarcotics Policy**

***President Betancur probably will be unable to sustain his unprecedented crackdown against Colombia's powerful narcotics traffickers, and the campaign will disrupt the illicit operations only temporarily.*** [redacted]

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The assassination last week of Colombia's Minister of Justice—widely attributed to drug traffickers—prompted Betancur to declare a state of siege, which severely limits freedom of travel and assembly. Police and military officials also have begun to raid the homes and offices of suspected traffickers. All narcotics cases have been placed under the jurisdiction of military courts. [redacted]

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The President has publicly reversed his earlier position and will now permit the extradition of Colombians wanted for crimes committed in other countries. According to the US Embassy, the government has reissued arrest warrants for two traffickers whose extradition to the US was denied last year and has ordered the armed forces to seek and arrest all such individuals wanted by the US. [redacted]

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**Comment:** The assassination stirred nationwide rage as well as embarrassment over the harm to Colombia's international image. Betancur is highly sensitive to public opinion and has been moved to his strongest actions thus far against the drug trade. [redacted]

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Nevertheless, popular support for the program probably will wane over the next few months. During this period, the major traffickers are likely to cut down operations to reduce their risks. [redacted]

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These circumstances, and Betancur's pride in nurturing domestic peace, may direct the President toward lifting the state of siege later in the year. The enforcement effort would then be returned to the weak civil and judicial authorities, enabling the traffickers to resume fairly normal operations. [redacted]

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**USSR-US: Attack by Chernenko**

General Secretary Chernenko's speech yesterday disparaging the latest US proposals on chemical weapons and MBFR marked the first such criticism by a Soviet leader. Chernenko called the draft treaty to ban chemical weapons a product of "deceitful maneuvers" and said that under its "rhetorical shell" is an "obvious" desire to legalize US intelligence gathering. Chernenko called the new Western MBFR proposal a repackaging of the old position and repeated his earlier statement that nuclear arms talks in Geneva can resume only if the US removes what he termed "obstacles" it has created and restores the previous situation.

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**Comment:** Chernenko's remarks seem intended to signal that the Soviets regard as inadequate the US response to his speech of 2 March. In that address he outlined possible moves—particularly on chemical weapons—that could promote a breakthrough in relations. The sharpness of his language and his failure to suggest alternative openings for a dialogue imply that the Soviets see little prospect soon for such an improvement and are anxious to lay blame for this situation on the US.

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**POLAND-USSR: Jaruzelski in Moscow**

Premier Jaruzelski was treated well yesterday during the Moscow portion of his two-day trip to the USSR, according to press reporting. He was formally presented with the Order of Lenin he was awarded last July. The communique following discussions with Soviet leaders described the talks as "warm and friendly." Jaruzelski also signed a long-term program for economic, scientific, and technical cooperation.

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**Comment:** The composition of the Polish delegation and the program document suggest that the status of the Polish party and Soviet economic assistance were the major topics of discussion. The description of the talks was more effusive than the one used after discussions in 1982. Jaruzelski's warm reception is consistent with recent evidence of Soviet support for his regime as the best possible in the present situation. Jaruzelski, nonetheless, probably had to defend the pace of Poland's normalization, following the recent protests in several Polish cities.

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**USSR-AFGHANISTAN: Execution of Soviet Officer**

Afghan insurgents told Western reporters yesterday that they executed a Soviet general captured last month in Konduz Province. The insurgents claimed they killed the officer to prevent his escape during a Soviet helicopter attack. [REDACTED]

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**Comment:** [REDACTED] The insurgents have not hesitated to kill Soviet prisoners in the past and may execute more during the current intensified Soviet military operations. The insurgents have been unable to negotiate prisoner exchanges or to gain other benefits from releasing Soviet captives. The various insurgent groups probably are holding fewer than 100 Soviet prisoners. [REDACTED]

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**WESTERN EUROPE-TURKEY: Council of Europe Prospects**

A key official of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe has told the US Embassy in Vienna that the assembly probably will accept the credentials of the Turkish delegation for its session that begins Monday. Nonetheless, debate on Turkey's democratic process remains on the agenda. The session follows a visit to Turkey by several assembly members who reported favorably on their tours of prisons and talks with government and opposition leaders. [REDACTED]

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**Comment:** A challenge to the Turkish credentials is still likely but probably will not succeed because some former critics, such as the Dutch Labor Party, now favor seating the Turks. Acceptance of the delegation would help patch up Ankara's relations with Western Europe. The assembly probably will pass a balanced resolution noting the Turkish Government's progress as well as its failings. Ankara will resist the debate but is likely to be buoyed by acceptance of its delegation and reduced allegations of torture and human rights abuses. [REDACTED]

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**DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Conflicting Claims of Deaths**

The US Embassy reports that evidence does not support claims by the radical left that more than 100 people were killed in the riots last week. The police reported that about 55 were killed, including 30 during the looting spree on 24 April. The Embassy estimates 200 to 300 persons were injured. Meanwhile, according to the government, markets set up in needy areas to sell basic foods at less than half price will soon be extended to reach one-fourth of the country's 6 million people. Labor leaders say this move further reduces the likelihood of a general strike. [REDACTED]

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**Comment:** The inability of the left to prove that the police suppressed the true death toll will damage its credibility and tends to support President Jorge Blanco's insistence that the security forces acted reasonably under chaotic conditions. Santo Domingo's swift action to implement subsidized food marketing for the poor should help restore its tarnished image as a populist government. [REDACTED]

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**USSR-AUSTRALIA-NEW ZEALAND: Fisheries Proposal**

A fishing agreement proposed by Moscow would permit Soviet oceanographic research in Australian territorial waters, according to an officer of the Australian Embassy in Moscow. Moscow also is seeking a ship repair facility in New Zealand to service the Soviet fishing fleet operating there and in the Antarctic and has asked permission for weekly Aeroflot flights to rotate fishing crews, according to New Zealand officials. Canberra reportedly has already rejected the Soviet request on security grounds. [REDACTED]

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**Comment:** Wellington also is likely to reject the Soviet request. The Soviets' fishing catch from southwestern Pacific waters has increased substantially since they began operating there in the early 1970s, but the current take still accounts for less than 1 percent of the Soviet catch. [REDACTED]

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**GREECE-BULGARIA: Small Arms Seizure**

Greek authorities on 2 May discovered more than 4,000 Belgian and Spanish pistols aboard a Cypriot freighter bound from Bulgaria to North Yemen, according to press reports. [REDACTED]

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**Comment:** The captured weapons—which are incompatible with those used in Eastern Europe—probably were purchased by Bulgarians for resale in the Middle East. Sofia is sensitive to Western press allegations about its role in international arms and drug smuggling and apparently is seeking to acquire Western arms via circuitous gray-market channels. This method allows Sofia to maintain an element of deniability should any of these weapons be discovered in the possession of terrorist or insurgent groups. [REDACTED]

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
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**YUGOSLAVIA: Price Freeze Lifted**

Yugoslavs are bracing for higher prices after the government this week lifted a price freeze imposed last December to quell runaway inflation. The move complies with one of the IMF's conditions for a \$380 million standby credit that helps pave the way for \$3.4 billion in assistance from Western governments and banks to meet Yugoslavia's debt obligations this year. To end the freeze, however, the federal government had to overcome strong regional opposition to its more stringent provisional controls over prices. 

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**Comment:** The new price policy conforms to the letter but not the spirit of the IMF agreement because the federal government can now intervene in cases where prices rise too rapidly. Continuing inflation—now about 60 percent annually despite the freeze—probably will lead financially strapped enterprises to cover their losses by seeking higher prices. As a result, for the next few months Belgrade will face increasing consumer frustration and pressures from financially troubled industries. 

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**In Brief****Europe**

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- **French** presidential adviser Debray on factfinding visit to **Nicaragua** . . . Managua emphasizing visit as indication of French support . . . mining issue likely to be discussed, but Debray has marginal influence in Paris . . . new French moves unlikely.

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- The Tories lost some large cities in local elections in **UK** on Thursday but retained two seats in the parliamentary byelections . . . reflects dissatisfaction with Prime Minister Thatcher's plans to curb local spending and reform municipal government.

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**Middle East**

- **Israeli** Government announced smaller than usual monthly price increase will be imposed on government-controlled items . . . officials want to limit inflation rate before election in July.
- **Iranian** warship conducted surveillance earlier this week of oil facilities off **United Arab Emirates** . . . closest and most prolonged in series of such air and naval surveillances . . . UAE concerned but planning no attempts to stop Iranians.

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**USSR**

- TASS yesterday accused three US diplomats in Moscow of conspiring with dissident Andrey Sakharov and his wife to organize new anti-**Soviet** propaganda campaign . . . wife probably detained by police to deter her from publicizing Sakharov's case.

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**Special Analysis****LATIN AMERICA: Perspective on the Elections**

***Latin America's three presidential elections tomorrow—in El Salvador, Panama, and Ecuador—represent a small step ahead for democracy. The apparent trend toward representative civilian government remains fragile, however, and could easily be reversed.*** [redacted]

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By Latin standards, all three elections may be relatively free of blatant fraud because all concerned would prefer—if possible—to avoid obvious manipulation of the voting. After they are elected, the new administrations will all face local variants of the many economic and social problems troubling the region. As with most civilian governments in Latin America, however, their most serious challenge is apt to be mere survival under the ever-present threat of military intervention. [redacted]

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As the results of the balloting come in over the next several days, the following are key factors to watch:

- In **El Salvador**, the percentage of the vote received by the expected winner, Christian Democrat Napoleon Duarte.
- In **Panama**, whether government standard bearer Nicolas Barletta manages to eke out victory over thrice-ousted former President Arias, who remains anathema to the armed forces.
- In **Ecuador**, the extent of any fraud that might be used to assure the election of the government's preferred candidate, center-leftist Rodrigo Borja. [redacted]

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**El Salvador: How Big a Win for Duarte?**

The US Embassy estimates that Duarte will defeat extreme rightist D'Aubuisson by 10 to 20 percentage points in heavy voting that will approximate the 1.4 million turnout for the first round. D'Aubuisson's backers reportedly are angry at the Election Commission and at the US Embassy, which they view as active opponents. This further reduces the chances that his party will be constructive in its opposition. [redacted]

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Duarte's campaign probably has reinforced rightist anxieties that he will be soft toward the insurgents. He has refrained from strong criticism of the guerrillas and has not promised to rule out power sharing with the insurgent alliance. He has also proved adept at matching D'Aubuisson's slander and invective and has failed to address the major interests of the generally conservative private sector. [redacted]

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If Duarte's victory margin is narrow—5 to 10 percentage points—he is likely to be more willing to consider the concerns of the right to avoid isolating his administration. A victory of 20 percentage points, however, probably would encourage his tendency to be ideologically rigid and to assert his authority. He would be less likely to try to conciliate moderate rightists and reduce tensions with D'Aubuisson's forces.

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### **Panama: Arias Versus the Military**

Panamanians will have seven presidential slates to choose from as they elect a civilian head of government for the first time since 1968. The only contest, however, is between progovernment coalition candidate Barletta and veteran opposition leader Arnulfo Arias. The winner will need only a plurality of the country's 918,000 registered voters to be eligible to serve a five-year term beginning on 11 October.

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A variety of polls indicate that Barletta is leading, although some respondents may have been reluctant to give honest answers. Both camps are claiming substantial leads. Unless Arias wins handily, his backers are likely to charge fraud and might respond with violent demonstrations. The military could contain these.

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Arias's desire to limit the military's power and prerogatives makes his possible election inherently destabilizing.

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neither Defense Forces Commander Noriega nor the military establishment would tolerate Arias in the presidency. If the 82-year-old Arias should win, the Defense Forces probably would move against him before the inauguration.

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### **Ecuador: A Question of Fraud**

Signs that center-leftist Rodrigo Borja is drawing ahead in the presidential race will increase the possibility of military intervention. A reliable independent poll states that Borja has merely maintained the slight lead he held nationwide, but the US Consulate in Guayaquil reports he may be taking some voters away from conservative Febres Cordero in the crucial coastal zone. A strong showing there by Borja could cause his opponent to charge fraud.

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
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